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In this issue we introduce a new feature: a shoner and less formal
essay to which replies of not more than 500 words are invited for the
next issue.
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics
Lloyd Reinhardt
A discussion of Wittgenstein and Aesthetics could be an attempt to
summarize his whole corpus. For Wingenstein was a philosopher who
would have liked to make us think very differently from the way we
do think, for the most part, in our epoch; and the difference he wanted
to effect is the difference, in one way of conceiving. between
understanding in science and understanding in art. The simplest
formulation is to say that there is a vital difference between causes
and reasons; and, indeed, Wingenstein spoke. when discussing Freud,
of the abominable mess that results from failing to distinguish reasons
and causes. I shall say more of this later.
Wittgenstein was hostile to scientism. I mean. and I hope he
meant. hostility to an ideology of science. or an idolizing of science,
an outlook wherein only the making and testing of causal explanatory
hypotheses is allowed to further our understanding. hypotheses that
must face the crucible of ex~rimentand the constraint of observahle
data. Wittgenstein's hostility to scientism was so great that it is
optimistic to assume that it was not plain hostility to science. But he
was trained as an engineer and his technical skills were considerahle,
in architecture and in assisting in the treatment of patients in hospitals
during World War II. There is no reason to think that his outlook was
like that of people who delight at what science has not yet explained.
who are vulnerahle to the latest stories of magical cures. spoon bending,
water divining or flying saucers. The philosopher who, early in life,
held that only the propositions of natural science made sense, did not
forget the distinctive advantage such propositions have when it comes
to being able to senle a question. being able to resolve disagreements.
Wittgenstein remained a sort of positivist in this respect: if the issue
can be resolved by empirical means, it does not belong to philosophy.
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Wittgenstein was much more interested in what we have to say for
ourselves and to each other of the kind that. as Plato saw. sometimes
causes anger and hatred when disagreement occurs.
This will. of course. be what we have to say when we speak of
ethics and art. Art is not far from ethics in this respect.
What do I mean by saying that art and ethics are kindred in an
important way? I can get the point across. I hope. by saying that art is
intermediate between ethics and mere preference. mere preference
being best exemplified by what is literally a matter of taste. I ask you
whether you like vanilla or chocolate better. Suppose you say vanilla.
Then I ask you to carry out the following thought experiment: imagine
yourself. from where you are now in your life. five years down the
track and imagine that. at that time. you have come to prefer chocolate
to vanilla. Think of yourself later. or. as we might say. your later self;
and ask if you regard the change as commendable or deplorable
development. Surely you will find it implausible to say that the
change from vanilla to chocolate is either commendable or deplorable.
either a case of growth in taste or a slide into vulgarity.
Now carry out the same test with. say. your attitude toward sexually
molesting children. You are now perhaps vehement about that matter.
Now imagine yourself, again five years down the traCk. the leading
child molester in Sydney. setting records for patience in the
neighbourhood of school playgrounds. Surely this is deplorahle
corruption. degeneration within you and your life; that is how you will
view it from where you are now. Of course. then. it will not matter to
you that it once mattered to you. But now it matters greatly that then it
would not matter.
Let us apply this test to our taste in art. You must he willing here to
substitute things that are appropriate to you; I ask myself whether I
prefer Mozart operas to Elvis Presley; and then I ask how I view my
later self with this preference reversed. This much is clear; it is not
like ice cream or child molestation. But it seems much nearer the
ethical end of the spectrum than the end of the spectrum that involves
mere preference.
Discussion of tllat test was not really a digression. though there is.
as far as I know. nothing quite like it in Wittgenstein. It amounts to a
distinction between preference and evaluation. But suppose that
someone pipes up and says. regarding the Mozart-Presley change. that
it is just a matter of background and habituation that I have the
preference I have. Such a one would explain my preference causally.
in psychological-sociological terms. We are familiar enough with that
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intellectual move; it is the blight of intellectual life. What one needs
to be good at is articulating what one admires or is moved hy in
Mozart and what one deplores or is repelled by in Presley. And one
needs to be able, in doing that, to characterize one's appreciation
and conviction in such a way that it is intel1igible how it can have
value in it that is similar to ethical value. Probably exploiting the
concept of sentimentality is one good way to do this, bringing out a
difference between objects that invite sentimentality and those that
resist or even deflect it, despite one's resolute determination to use a
work sentimental1y. The talk here will be a mixture of technical
appreciation and more or less successful rendering into words
something of what the work expresses. It may sometimes he just a
matter of cal1ing attention to something. One speaks of simplicity and
its marvels; but nothing shows that better than the duet from The
Magic Flute.
It is that difference in what is taken to be useful for understanding
response, and so for possihly eliciting it-the critic's hope-that is
important here. Genetic explanations, either of the work or of the love
or hate of it, are not in place. I do not mean, and Wittgenstein did not
mean that genetic explanations are never in place. I shall briefly
mention later his criticisms of Frazer's Golden Bough. where he does
seem to be repudiating genetic explanations. But much he says would
allow that a genetic explanation and an aesthetic or, as I would say,
formal explanation. can hoth he appropriate for different interests.
When this is what he seems to be saying. one is reminded of Aristotlc's
distinctions among material, efficient, formal and final causes; or four
ways of asking and answering the question Why? For thosc familiar
with Aristotle, it may he useful to say that Wittgenstein is insisting on
the importance of formal causes. A formal cause, in Aristotle's thought.
is what you are told about in answer to a question such as 'Why is the
arm bent like thatT, that it is because the statue is of a discus thrower.
The same interrogative sentence could have been used to ask instead a
question that sought an answer in terms of the force exerted on the
material to bend it as it is hent.
Wittgenstein was interested in Freud, and the problem of genesis
as opposed to formal explanation is his theme there. a<; well as with
Frazer. When he talked ahout Freud, he spoke of confusion hetween
reasons and causes. nut. as Frank Cioffi has made us appreciate. even
then it is not completely clear just which of various antitheses
Wittgenstein had in mind. t A clear example of one antithesis is the
contrast hetween a trafl1c light acting on you like a drug. and a traffic
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light cntering into why you stop, that is because you recognizc it as
meaning that you are to stop. You give a causal explanation in one
case and you give a reason in the other. It is precisely scicntism to
suppose that giving a reason is just a temporary expedient, to be
improved on when we know more about the human brain and nervous
system, and so can give a neurophysiological account of what took
place.
The replacement of our ordinary ways ofunderstanding each other.
in terms of our beliefs and our desires. by shiny, up-to-date science
has been around for a while. There used to be students, mostly from
psychology departments, who claimed to admire Shakespeare because
he was able to sec so much without benefit of modern psychology: as
though he were to be compared to Babylonians, doing quite well at
astronomy without benefit of telescopes. A quotation from the lale
Paul Grice bears on this kind of scient ism. He imagines a
neurophysiologist speaking to his wife:
My (for at least a little while longer) dear, I have long thought of myself
as an acute and well-informed interpreter of your actions and behaviour. I
think I have heen able to identify nearly every thought that has made you
smile and nearly every desire that has moved you to act. My researches,
however, have made such progress that I shall no longer need to understand
you in this way. Instead I shall he in a position, with the aid of instruments
which I shall allal:h to you, to assign to each bodily movement which you
make in acting a specific antccedent condition in your cortex. No longer
shall I need to l:oncern myself with your so-called thoughts and feelings.
In the meantime. perhaps you would have dinner with me tonigill. I trusl
that you will not resist if I hring along some apparatus to help me to
determine, as quickly as possible, the physiological idiosym:rasics which
obtain in your system. .
Grice says he has the feeling that the lady might refuse the proffered
invitation.2 But this may be unfair to many psychologists. Here is one.
quoted by Frank Cioffi in the article already mentioned: Gustav
Ichheiser writes:
Our feelings are often peculiarly vague and elusive (so) we have
considerahle difficulty in descrihing them corrcctly ... we are aware of
the innumerahle symholil: meanings which permeate our perceptual
experience ... and we must react (0 them ... in a peculiarly implicit way
... What we l:all insight consists in the ability to make these meanings
explicit.
Wittgenstein himself. trying further to elucidale his distinction
between reasons and causes, speaks of all of the following: hypo~heses
and further descriptions; the cause of an impression and getting clear
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about it, as in getting clear about why you laughed; an empirical
explanation of a mental state and working out what was at the back of
our mind; science and sounding like science; agood way of represcnting
a fact, a discovery, and persuasion. These may all he suhtly and
importantly different differences.
The bearing on aesthetics seems clear enough. In understanding
one's own responses, in inducing them in friends or audiences for
critical reflection on art, much of the enterprise is surely a mattcr of
these further descriptions, much a matter of finding the way to hit
things off. But as I have already said, another part of this enterprise
may be somewhat more-and I think this is the right word-technical.
For one may need to describe mechanisms. These will vary from
medium to medium. And a crucial point is that the description may
need to be carried on in the presence of the work, helping another to
see how something is achieved or how awful it would be if just this or
that were different.
An important fact about such talk is that there is probably nothing
on the technical level-which is, so to speak, the factual part of
aesthetic discourse-that allows much in the way of generalization.
Something which really helps to explain an effect here may very well
be something which, elsewhere, in another work, would be a disaster.
A fine example to which this point applies occurs in Jane Austen's
Emma, where a deliberate piece of bad grammar contributes to the
effect created by the writer: Emma is with Mr. Knightley, whom she
will eventually marry, but is still not fully aware that she loves him:
He looked at her wilh a glow of regard. She was warmly gratified-and in
another moment still more so, by a little movement of more lhan common
friendliness on his part. lie took her hand.-whether she had nOl herself
made the first a motion, she could not say-she mighl perhaps have
rather offered it--but he took her hand, pressed it, and certainly was on
the ;point of carrying it 10 his lips-when, from some fancy or other, he
suddenly let it go.-Why he should feel such a scruple, why he should
change his mind when il was all but done, she could not perceive.-He
would have judged better, she Ihought, if he had nOl stopped.-The
intention however, was indubitable; and whether it was that his manners
had in general so lillie gallantry. or however else it happened. but she
thought nothing became him more.-It was with him, of so simple, yet so
dignified a nature.-She could not but recall the attempt with greal
satisfaction. It spoke such a perfect amity.-He left lhem immedialely
afterwards-gone in a moment. (Ch.45)3
The solecism is the insertion of the word 'but' in the long sentence
beginning with the words 'The intention however ... ' Even if some
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would disagree that this is a solecism (I am not one of them), there is
no doubt that 'but', as it there occurs, contributes vitally to the effect
of the passage, that effect being of a sort of disruption, or even
eruption in Emma's thought. But to cite this in explanation of Austen's
success here does not lead to any useful generalisation about grammar
and similar effects elsewhere. (For those who find the grammar
acceptable, the point might be that the insertion of 'but' is certainly
unnecessary for the sense of the passage. But il is probably best for
those who think the grammar acceptable to consider, with the help of
examples of their own, the generality that generality in such cases is
likely to be futile.)
To notice such a detail and bring out how it is effective and to see
how attending to it, in its context, can enhance appreciation is, I think,
one of criticism's main tasks. But the interaction between critic and
artist guarantees that no philosopher or critic is likely to get away with
a generalization ahout what makes for good works of art, even if only
of this kind, where kind is a matter of the medium. If a critic should
dare, especially in our time, to say that A, B, and C. were necessary
and sufficient, or even necessary or sufficient for something being
good, it wouldn't be long before practising artists made some things
that refuted these hypotheses. Thus one of the main tasks of aesthetics
is inherently inimical to the generalization we look for in science.
That, of course, does not mean that there are no responsihilities to
evidence or the like here. The very case, involving attention to, and
respect for, the detail of a work, goes against saying anything so
stupid. Rather, God is in the details, as, I anI told, Raubert once said.
The technical task and the effort to articulate response. to develop
it and say further illuminating things about a work, arc not really
separate, since the articulation may proceed aided by a line sense for
relevant technical features. But there are cases where the business of
just hitting it off predominates. And we do not need to look to high art
for this. Our own bodily sensations provide us with material for
aesthetic discourse. Saying how it feels, bodily speaking, is an everyday
poetry. Metaphors are rife, such as 'butterflies in my stomach'.
'jackhammer in my skull'. 'a vice tightening on my head', 'pins and
needles', and so on. There is room for improvement and criticism, as
when one is offered 'soda water in my arm' in place of 'pins and
needles'. I've tried in vain to persuade anthropologist friends to make
a study of this matter, to see what the everyday poetry of alien peoples
is like, how it contrasts with ours. Note that sensations can be idcritilied
and described with phrases such as 'the sensation you get when the
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circulation is coming back in your ann after it has been lain on for a
while.' I suppose this is comparable to what I have spoken of as
technical in talking about art. It is indeed technical; one can easily
imagine people who know too little about blood circulation to
understand the description even if, as is likely, they are familiar with
the sensation.
Let me conclude with a mention of Wittgenstein's criticism of
Frazer for his work in The Golden Bough. 4 Frazer believed that the
practices he was interested in involved magical beliefs; and he
conceived of such beliefs as bad causal hypotheses, on the model of
dancing to make it rain. Apparently it did not occur to him that people
might dance as a way of reconciling themselves to their dependence
on rain. Maybe some of them believe their dancing is causally
efficacious and maybe some of their fellows regard them as
superstitious or foolish for that. After all, some Christians among us
think prayer is causally efficacious and other Christians among us
criticize that view, emphasising the idea that proper prayer is a way of
accepting God's will, not trying to influence it. Moreover, in our own
culture, we often reconcile ourselves to something harmful or helpful
to our interests by speaking of good and bad fortune, of luck. But luck
is not a causal hypothesis! Nor is it a hypothesis to speak of the will
of God.
Two examples of Frazer's approach that Wittgenstein discussed
were the fire festivals of Beltane, in Scotland, and a practice of
Bosnian Muslims involving a form of adoption, as I would put it. In
the fire festivals, effigies are thrown into a fire; and it is characteristic
of a school of anthropology, originated by Frazer, to explain this by
speaking of a time gone by when human sacrifice was carried out,
saying this current practice has its origin in real human sacrilice.
Wittgenstein seems not so much to want to deny the historical daim,
but to say that one doesn't need that information to see and appreciate
the connection with human sacrifice. The relationship to human
sacrifice is a relation he calls internal or formal. not external and
genetic, as when one sees the relation of a circle to an ellipse, a
relationship someone might be got to see by holding a circular object
in front of him. tilting it slowly and asking him to notice when the
appearance is roughly the same as one of an ellipse that is drawn on
the hoard. lltis would not be to say that the drawn ellipse had its
origin in a circle, though an elliptical piece of string might have been
so transformed. Thus Wittgcnstein does not seem to be saying that it
is false to postulate a historical origin. He rather seems to be saying
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that to focus on the genetic story is to distract us from the significance,
the awe, of the ritual itself, It is scientism.
Frazer's observations of the Bosnian Muslim ritual of, as I will
say, adoption, arc really outrageous, while what he said about the fire
festival was not that so much, but instead a mistake about how to
bring out the significance or meaning of a ritual. In Bosnia then-and
perhaps now for all I know-a woman, in effect, adopts an infant horn
to another woman by standing among her tribespeople in a large and
loose garment and passing the infant through the clothing, thus
becoming its mother. I find this an impressive and attractive ceremony
of adoption. I know nothing about the conditions under which women
surrendered their biological offspring for these purposes, and nothing
about the circumstances of the adopting mothers, But Frazer,
astonishingly, learned of this practice and said that the woman. passing
the child through her clothing, thinks she has given birth to it.
Wittgenstein's reaction is apt; he says: 'Aber sie hat nicht ein Fehlcr
gemacht!' (But she hasn't made a mistake!), No woman could. This
remains so even, if in that language, it there is only one verb which we
should translate into English disjunctively as 'gives birth to or adopts'.
The philistinism of Frazer's reading of the ritual is emblematic for
Wittgenstein of a response that is encouraged in our scientific culture.
Perhaps by now. forty years after Wittgenstein's death, the
encouragement has gone so far that it has produced an unfortunate
overreaction, the treatment of science as only a form of literature or a
branch of rhetoric. It can do art no good, the humanities no good, and
is likely only to attract contempt from scientists. to he so stupid.
Rather we should exploit Wittgenstein's work to get clear and keep
clear about the difference between science and art,
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